Naturalization: Successful Appeal Against the Loss of German Citizenship

Higher Administrative Court of Bremen, Judgment of 10.03.2020 – 1 LC 171/16

There are several ways to obtain German citizenship. The simplest is if you have at least one German parent and live in the Federal Republic of Germany, as this automatically grants German citizenship. But what happens if the supposed German parent is not the biological parent after all?

In the present case, a nearly one-year-old child lost its German citizenship because it turned out that the presumed German father was not the biological father. The lawsuit against this was dismissed, but the Higher Administrative Court of Bremen overturned this judgment because there was no legal provision stating that German citizenship would be lost if paternity is contested.

Facts of the Case:

The plaintiff sought the determination that he is a German citizen.

The plaintiff was born in 2014 and was therefore almost one year old. His mother was a Ghanaian citizen, and the German citizen J.A. was registered as his father, to whom the mother was married at the time of the plaintiff’s birth, granting the plaintiff German citizenship as well. Later that year, K.A. filed a paternity recognition, which the mother agreed to. On October 8, 2014, the Bremen District Court determined that J.A. was not the father. As a result, on September 7, 2015, the Bremen City Office declared that the plaintiff was not in possession of German citizenship.

Denial by the Immigration Office and Subsequent Lawsuit by the Parents

On October 8, 2015, the plaintiff filed a lawsuit against this decision, requesting that the Bremen City Office be obliged to establish that he was a German citizen.

The Bremen Administrative Court dismissed the lawsuit and declared the decision of September 7, 2015, to be lawful.

In response, the plaintiff appealed, seeking to overturn both the ruling of the Bremen Administrative Court and the decision of September 7, 2015, and requested that the defendant be obliged to determine the plaintiff’s German citizenship.

Judgment of the Higher Administrative Court of Bremen:

The plaintiff appealed against the dismissive judgment of the Administrative Court.

The plaintiff’s admissible appeal was successful. He was entitled to German citizenship against the defendant.

The Bremen Higher Administrative Court first argued that the loss of the plaintiff’s German citizenship under Article 16 (1) sentence 2 of the Basic Law requires a legal basis, subject to strict requirements.

Article 16 (1) sentence 1 of the Basic Law states: “German citizenship may not be revoked.” However, this did not exclude the possibility of losing the plaintiff’s German citizenship from the outset, as the loss was not a revocation but a deprivation of citizenship. A deprivation of German citizenship is defined as any loss that impairs citizenship’s function as a reliable basis for equal membership in the national community (cf. Federal Constitutional Court, Decision of 17.07.2019 – 2 BvR 1327/18, juris para. 23 with further references). Such impairment does not occur when citizenship is lost due to non-governmental contestation of paternity, at least not when the affected child is at an age when children typically have not yet developed their own trust in the permanence of their citizenship (cf. Federal Constitutional Court, ibid., juris para. 24). When J.A.’s paternity was contested, the plaintiff had not yet completed his first year of life, and such trust in the permanence of his citizenship did not exist at that time.

Citizenship Loss Only Permitted If Statelessness Is Avoided

According to Article 16 (1) sentence 2 of the Basic Law, loss of citizenship against the will of the affected person may only occur based on a law and only if the person does not become stateless as a result. The legal reservation to act only with a law is not solely fulfilled by the legislator’s creation of a provision for loss; further requirements regarding the clarity of the provision must also be observed. Article 16 (1) sentence 2 of the Basic Law mandates that the loss of citizenship must be regulated so clearly that the function of citizenship as a reliable basis for equal membership in the national community is not impaired (Federal Constitutional Court, Decision of 17.12.2013 – 1 BvL 6/10, juris para. 81; Decision of 17.07.2019 – 2 BvR 1327/18, juris para. 33). The reliability of the citizenship status includes the predictability of loss, providing sufficient legal security and clarity in the area of citizenship loss regulations (Federal Constitutional Court, Decision of 17.07.2019 – 2 BvR 1327/18, juris para. 23; Judgment of 24.05.2006 – 2 BvR 669/04, juris para. 50; Higher Administrative Court of Lower Saxony, Decision of 12.09.2019 – 8 ME 66/19, juris para. 48). The requirements for the clarity of the loss provision vary based on the degree of trust in the permanence of citizenship (cf. Federal Constitutional Court, Judgment of 24.05.2006 – 2 BvR 669/04, juris paras. 88 f.).

The legal reservation is therefore only satisfied in the case of a citizenship loss due to the contestation of paternity when the legal consequence of the loss of citizenship is clearly stated in the wording of a statutory norm. This applies regardless of whether the contestation of paternity is conducted by an authority or by the child’s mother or father.

The legal requirements for a statutory regulation concerning the loss of German citizenship following the contestation of paternity have repeatedly been the subject of Federal Constitutional Court decisions. Regarding the loss of German citizenship due to an official contestation of paternity, the Federal Constitutional Court had decided that the legal reservation places “strict requirements” on the regulation of citizenship. A merely implicit regulation, which only implies that the official contestation leads to a loss of citizenship, does not meet these requirements (Federal Constitutional Court, Decision of 17.12.2013 – 1 BvL 6/10, juris para. 83). In a subsequent decision, also concerning the definition of the requirements for the legal reservation (but this time for a non-official contestation of paternity), the Federal Constitutional Court explicitly referred to the “strict requirements” of the legal reservation developed for the loss of citizenship due to an official contestation (Federal Constitutional Court, Decision of 17.07.2019 – 2 BvR 1327/18, juris para. 33 referring to Federal Constitutional Court, Decision of 17.12.2013 – 1 BvL 6/10, juris para. 83 = BVerfGE 135, 48 ). These strict requirements do not necessarily exclude a loss of German citizenship of the child as a result of a paternity contestation but require the legislator to create a clear regulation that the contestation of paternity can indeed lead to a loss of citizenship. According to the case law of the Federal Constitutional Court, no lower requirements should be placed on a legal provision regarding the loss of German citizenship due to a non-official contestation of paternity than on a provision regarding the loss through an official contestation.

The Child Cannot Influence the Deprivation of Citizenship

It could be argued that the Federal Constitutional Court views the loss of citizenship due to an official contestation of paternity as an unconstitutional deprivation of citizenship because the affected child cannot influence the deprivation (Federal Constitutional Court, Decision of 17.12.2013 – 1 BvL 6/10, juris paras. 31, 50 f.). This applies only in cases where the acknowledgment of paternity does not aim to circumvent legal residency requirements. From these explanations of the Federal Constitutional Court, it can be inferred that a successful official contestation often constitutes a particularly severe and absolutely prohibited deprivation of citizenship under Article 16 (1) sentence 1 of the Basic Law because neither the child nor the parents have any influence. However, from these explanations, it cannot be inferred that the legal reservation under Article 16 (1) sentence 2 of the Basic Law imposes lower requirements on the legal provision of a loss event due to a non-official paternity contestation. Instead, the strict requirements of the legal reservation derived by the Federal Constitutional Court apply explicitly to the constitutional requirements that Article 16 (1) sentence 2 of the Basic Law imposes on any loss of citizenship due to the contestation of paternity.

The same requirements apply to the legal reservation for the loss of citizenship for both official and non-official paternity contestations, as these are essentially equally intense intrusions into Article 16 (1) sentence 2 of the Basic Law (cf. Federal Constitutional Court, Decision of 17.12.2013 – 1 BvL 6/10, juris para. 85; Decision of 17.07.2019 – 2 BvR 1327/18, juris para. 34). The consequence in both cases, namely the loss of German citizenship, is equally severe for the affected child (cf. Federal Constitutional Court, Decision of 17.12.2013 – 1 BvL 6/10, juris para. 85; Decision of 17.07.2019 – 2 BvR 1327/18, juris para. 34). Just because the official contestation aims to eliminate the child’s citizenship (Federal Administrative Court, Judgment of 19.04.2018 – 1 C 1/17, juris para. 36) does not mean that there is a significant distinction regarding the intensity of the intrusion. For the intensity of the intrusion into Article 16 (1) sentence 2 of the Basic Law, the scope of the reduction of the protected area is primarily relevant. However, the burden placed on the plaintiff by the loss of citizenship due to the contesting party does not weigh more heavily.

The comparability of the intrusions is also supported by the fact that the minor child is equally worthy of protection in both cases. The child was not responsible for who was recognized as its father. Nor did it have any personal influence over the contestation of a paternity established under § 1592 No. 1 or No. 2 of the German Civil Code (BGB). The different degrees of influence the parents may have on the loss of citizenship have no significant impact on the child’s protection because they primarily concern distinguishing between the deprivation and the loss of citizenship (cf. Federal Constitutional Court, Decision of 17.12.2013 – 1 BvL 6/10, juris paras. 26 ff., 80; Decision of 17.07.2019 – 2 BvR 1327/18, juris para. 28; Federal Administrative Court, Judgment of 19.04.2018 – 1 C 1/17, juris para. 24).

Just because the official contestation intrudes more intensively into the fundamental rights of the parents does not mean that the official and non-official contestation cannot be compared; for regarding the intrusion into Article 16 (1) sentence 2 of the Basic Law, the loss of citizenship is equally intense for the child. The official contestation, initiated by the state, intrudes into the private family law relationships by retroactively terminating the legal paternity against the family members‘ will (Federal Administrative Court, Judgment of 19.04.2018 – 1 C 1/17, juris para. 36). This also intrudes into the existence of parenthood protected by Article 6 (2) sentence 1 of the Basic Law (cf. Federal Constitutional Court, Decision of 17.12.2013 – 1 BvL 6/10, juris para. 94) and the child’s right to the assurance of parental care and upbringing protected by Article 2 (1) in conjunction with Article 6 (2) sentence 1 of the Basic Law (cf. Federal Constitutional Court, ibid., juris para. 102).

Although the non-official contestation can also result in an intrusion into these fundamental rights (cf. Federal Constitutional Court, Decision of 04.12.1974 – 1 BvL 14/73, juris), since this intrusion is initiated by someone who also possesses fundamental rights, it is less intense than the purely state-driven official contestation. Due to this more intense intrusion into the fundamental rights, the official contestation must therefore meet higher requirements for justifying such an intrusion. However, this does not result in higher requirements for the legal reservation regarding intrusions into Article 16 (1) sentence 2 of the Basic Law. These requirements depend solely on the intensity of the intrusion into Article 16 (1) sentence 2 of the Basic Law because compliance with the legal reservation is a prerequisite for its justification. The intensity of the intrusion is not increased by the fact that the official contestation also intrudes into other fundamental rights.

A legal basis that meets these constitutional requirements does not exist for the loss of citizenship due to the determination of non-existence of paternity under § 1599 BGB.

Such a legal basis could not be derived from § 1599 (1) BGB, § 4 (1) sentence 1 StAG, or § 17 (2) and (3) sentence 1 variant 3 StAG as individual provisions or from the interaction of these provisions (similar conclusion: VG Lüneburg, Judgment of 28.11.2019 – 6 A 112/18, juris para. 29; different view: OVG Lower Saxony, Decision of 12.09.2019 – 8 ME 66/19, juris paras. 46 ff.).

§ 1599 Abs. 1 BGB regelt, unter welchen Voraussetzungen die Fiktionswirkung des § 1592 Nr. 1 BGB nicht gilt und damit die Vaterschaft des Mannes, der zum Zeitpunkt der Geburt mit der Mutter des Kindes verheiratet gewesen war, rückwirkend entfällt. Der Wortlaut der Vorschrift enthält aber weder eine ausdrückliche Regelung noch einen Anhaltspunkt für eine darüber hinaus gehende Regelung, welche Rechtsfolgen aus dem rückwirkenden Entfallen der Vaterschaft resultieren.

Auch § 4 Abs. 1 Satz 1 StAG griff nicht durch, da diese keine Regelung zum Verlust, sondern zum Erwerb der Staatsangehörigkeit darstellt.

Die eingefügten Regelungen von § 17 Abs. 2 und 3 StAG stellen ebenfalls keine gesetzliche Grundlage für den Wegfall der Staatsangehörigkeit dar. § 17 Abs. 2 StAG legt fest, dass der Verlust der Staatsangehörigkeit nach Absatz 1 Nr. 7 nicht die kraft Gesetzes erworbene deutsche Staatsangehörigkeit Dritter berührt, sofern diese das fünfte Lebensjahr vollendet haben. Nach § 17 Abs. 3 Satz 1 StAG gilt Absatz 2 entsprechend bei Entscheidungen nach anderen Gesetzen, die den rückwirkenden Verlust der deutschen Staatsangehörigkeit Dritter zur Folge hätten, insbesondere bei der Rücknahme der Niederlassungserlaubnis nach § 51 Abs. 1 Nr. 3 des Aufenthaltsgesetzes, bei der Rücknahme einer Bescheinigung nach § 15 des Bundesvertriebenengesetzes und bei der Feststellung des Nichtbestehens der Vaterschaft nach § 1599 des Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuches.

Dem Gesetzesvorbehalt des Art. 16 Abs. 1 Satz 2 GG ist damit weiterhin nicht genügt, weil nicht ausdrücklich gesetzlich geregelt ist, dass die Staatsangehörigkeit infolge der Feststellung des Nichtbestehens der Vaterschaft wegfällt (a.A. OVG Nds., Beschl. v. 12.09.2019 – 8 ME 66/19, juris Rn. 49). § 17 Abs. 2 und 3 StAG impliziert lediglich, dass die Anfechtung der Vaterschaft zum Verlust der Staatsangehörigkeit führt, und regelt damit den Verlust der Staatsangehörigkeit nur mittelbar (BVerfG, Beschl. v. 17.12.2013 – 1 BvL 6/10, juris Rn. 83; BVerwG, Urt. v. 19.04.2018 – 1 C 1/17, juris Rn. 34; OVG S-H, Beschl. v. 11.05.2016 – 4 O 12/16, juris Rn. 14); damit setzt auch diese Vorschrift einen anderweitig gesetzlich vorgesehenen Verlust voraus, ohne ihn selbst zu regeln (BVerwG, Urt. v. 19.04.2018 – 1 C 1/17, juris Rn. 34).

Der Wortlaut von § 17 Abs. 3 Satz 1 StAG („Absatz 2 gilt entsprechend“) legt nahe, dass sich der Regelungszweck der Vorschrift darin erschöpft, die Altersgrenze für den Verlust der Staatsangehörigkeit auf aus anderen Vorschriften resultierende Verluste der deutschen Staatsangehörigkeit anzuwenden. Die im Gesetzestext nachfolgende ausdrückliche Benennung des Nichtbestehens der Vaterschaft nach § 1599 BGB ist ebenfalls nicht so formuliert, dass von einer Normierung der Rechtsfolge des Wegfalls der Staatsangehörigkeit auszugehen ist. Die Einleitung „insbesondere bei“ spricht vielmehr dafür, dass klarstellend beispielhaft einige der von § 17 Abs. 3 Satz 1 StAG erfassten Sachverhalte benannt werden sollen. Nach dem Wortlaut hat § 17 Abs. 3 Satz 1 StAG also ausschließlich eine die Staatsangehörigkeit schützende Wirkung (vgl. VG Lüneburg, Urt. v. 28.11.2019 – 6 A 112/18, juris Rn. 28); er macht den Wegfall der Staatsangehörigkeit nach nichtbehördlicher Anfechtung der Vaterschaft davon abhängig, dass die Altersgrenze nach § 17 Abs. 2 StAG eingehalten wird.

Diese Auslegung steht nicht im Widerspruch zur Entstehungsgeschichte von § 17 Abs. 2 und 3 StAG. Zum Zeitpunkt des 2009 abgeschlossenen Gesetzgebungsverfahrens wurde in der Rechtsprechung – inklusive der des Bundesverfassungsgerichts – mit unterschiedlichen Begründungen unumstritten davon ausgegangen, dass der Wegfall der Staatsangehörigkeit als Folge einer nicht behördlich initiierten rechtskräftigen Feststellung des Nichtbestehens der die Staatsangehörigkeit vermittelnden Vaterschaft eintritt und dieser Wegfall keinen grundsätzlichen verfassungsrechtlichen Bedenken begegnet (vgl. BVerfG, Beschl. v. 24.10.2006 – 2 BvR 696/04, juris Rn. 21 m.w.N.). Anlass zu Zweifeln an dieser rechtlichen Bewertung hat erst die Entscheidung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts zur behördlichen Vaterschaftsanfechtung (Beschl. v. 17.12.2013 – 1 BvL 6/10) gegeben.

Aus dem Sinn und Zweck der Ergänzung von § 17 StAG um die Absätze 2 und 3 kann ebenfalls nicht abgeleitet werden, dass damit der Wegfall der Staatsangehörigkeit konstitutiv angeordnet werden sollte. Durch die Ergänzung sollte der Verlust der Staatsangehörigkeit rechtssicher geregelt werden (vgl. Bundestags-Drs. 16/10528, S. 6 f.). Zwar würde unter Berücksichtigung der inzwischen ergangenen Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts eine Umsetzung dieses Ziels eine ausdrückliche Regelung des Wegfalls der Staatsangehörigkeit erforderlich machen. Jedoch ist bei dem Sinn und Zweck der Vorschrift auch zu berücksichtigen, von welchem konkreten Regelungsbedarf der Gesetzgeber ausgegangen ist. Nach der Gesetzesbegründung ist der Regelungsbedarf aus zwei Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts (Urt. v. 24.05.2006 – 2 BvR 669/04 und Beschl. v. 24.10.2006 – 2 BvR 696/04) abgeleitet worden. In Bezug auf den rückwirkenden Wegfall der deutschen Staatsangehörigkeit eines Kindes infolge der erfolgreichen Anfechtung der Vaterschaft kann der einschlägigen Entscheidung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts – wovon der Gesetzgeber zutreffend ausgegangen ist (vgl. Bundestags-Drs. 16/10528, S. 7) – lediglich die Notwendigkeit der Begrenzung des Wegfalls der Staatsangehörigkeit, nicht aber ein Bedarf für deren konstitutive Regelung entnommen werden (vgl. BVerfG, Beschl. v. 24.10.2006 – 2 BvR 696/04, juris Rn. 19 ff.). Auf diesen Regelungsbedarf ist infolgedessen der Gesetzzweck begrenzt.

Eine ausdrückliche gesetzliche Regelung des Wegfalls der Staatsangehörigkeit ergibt sich auch nicht aus einem Zusammenwirken von § 1599 BGB mit § 4 Abs. 1 Satz 1 StAG und § 17 Abs. 2 und Abs. 3 Satz 1 Var. 3 StAG. Eine ausdrückliche Regelung erfordert eine klare Benennung der Rechtsfolge des Wegfalls der Staatsangehörigkeit bei Anfechtung der Vaterschaft. Die angeführten Rechtsvorschriften enthalten zwar nach allgemeiner Überzeugung (alleinige Ableitung der deutschen Staatsangehörigkeit vom ursprünglichen Vater) bzw. nach ausdrücklicher gesetzlicher Anordnung (Altersgrenze des fünften Lebensjahrs) notwendige Voraussetzungen für den Wegfall der Staatsangehörigkeit. Weder den Einzelvorschriften noch deren Zusammenwirken kann aber eindeutig die Rechtsfolge des Wegfalls der Staatsangehörigkeit entnommen werden. […]

Oberverwaltungsgericht Bremen

Important Note: The content of this article has been prepared to the best of our knowledge and belief. However, due to the complexity and constant evolution of the subject matter, we must exclude liability and warranty. Important Notice: The content of this article has been created to the best of our knowledge and understanding. However, due to the complexity and constant changes in the subject matter, we must exclude any liability and warranty.

If you need legal advice, please feel free to call us at 0221 - 80187670 or send us an email at or send an email to info@mth-partner.de info@mth-partner.de

Lawyers in Cologne advise and represent clients nationwide in immigration law.

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *